Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 29, 2013

Dostoyevsky: Notes from the Underground

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor: Notes from the Underground, Dover Thrift Edition,



I found this book depressing but it seemed SO familiar.  The main character, the underground man himself with his self-pity and his determination for self-sabotage was someone I felt I had read about before.  Maybe it's just a Russian archetype.  He was quite frustrating but Dosteyevsky wrote it all so beautifully: what he thought and felt, how he appeared to others, his opportunities for redemption and how he would throw it away.  I actually thought he might allow things to work out with Liza and get out of his funk but he was determined to keep himself down.  I loved the character of Appollon, so passive-aggressive, he must have driven the neurotic underground man crazy.

On pg 31, he is thinking back on his younger days and how he has come to be where he is now.  he scoffs at Romanticism "We Russians, speaking generally, have never had those foolish transcendental "romantics" -- German, and still more French -- on whom nothing produces any effect; if there were an earthquake, if all France perished at the barricades, they would still be the same, they would not even have the decency to affect a change, but would still go on singing their transcendental songs to the hour of their death, because they are fools."  He goes on to describe what the Russian 'romantic' is and it's quite a humorous description as he describes quite pragmatic romantics, always with an eye out for advantage.
"That is why there are so many 'broad natures' among us who never lose their ideal even in the depths of degradation; and though they never stir a finger for their ideal,..., yet they tearfully cherish their first ideal and are extraordinarily honest at heart." pg 32

He really is a sad character and though he is pitiful, there is something of his insecurity in many of us.  He says pg 31 "Another circumstance, too, worried me in those days: that there was no one like me and I was unlike everyone else.  'I am alone and they are everyone'.

He describes himself as pitiful, loathsome, hysterical etc. He is very untrustworthy as a narrator and he tells us so frequently (pg 33, pg 26, pg 27, pg 22, pg 25)
After he tries to pick a fight and get thrown out of a window [he is unsuccessful in his defenestration attempt], he says "I never have been a coward at heart, though I have always been a coward in action." pg 34
He starts to stalk an officer he has become obsessed with.  He refers to himself several times as a fly (pg 34 "I had been treated like a fly"; pg 36 "that I was a mere fly in the eyes of all this world, a nasty, disgusting fly -- more intelligent, more highly developed, more refined in feeling than any of them, of course -- but a fly that was continually making way for everyone, insulted and injured by everyone."; "All of them took scarcely any notice of my entrance, which was strange, for I had not met them for years.  Evidently they looked upon me as something on the level of a common fly." pg 42)

The underground man indulges in fantasies about how life could be where he was admired and loved.  "Everyone would kiss me and weep (what idiots they would be if they did not), while I should go barefoot and hungry preaching new ideas and fighting a victorious Austerlitz against the obscurantists. pg 40

He runs into old school friends and they are planning a party for Zverkov, a rich friend (who came in for an estate of 200 serfs while still a school).  The underground man hates him because of his advantages, what he calls being "favoured by the gifts of nature."

He didn't do well at school.  He was intelligent and knew the material but couldn't get along.  "Once indeed I did have a friend.  But I was already a tyrant at heart; I wanted to exercise unbounded sway over him..." pg 47  He is so insecure about everything combined with false bravado about his superiority.  He invites himself along to a get-together.  He wants everything to go perfectly, to be able to redeem himself in their eyes.  He sneaks away from work 2 hours early to be able to get ready  "The great thing, I thought, is not to be the first to arrive, or they will think I am overjoyed at coming.  But there were 1000 of such great points to consider , and they all agitated and overwhelmed me." pg 47.
He overthinks and obsesses about everything.

Of course it all goes terribly wrong, and where he can make it worse he does.  It's horrifying to observe him sabotage himself with absolutely everyone he encounters.

It was interesting to think about what Dostoyevsky would have been thinking and feeling as he was about the same age as his protagonist when he wrote this.  It's very dark but then I find so many Russian stories have this same dark fatalism.

Sunday, January 27, 2013

Nietzsche: The Genealogy of Morality

Nietzsche, Friedrich: The Genealogy of Morality, Tr. Maudemarie Clark & Alan J Swensen, Hackett Publishing Co, Indianapolis, 1998


This book was first published in 1887.  My 1st instinct when reading the introduction to this book was resistance.  As I read that Nietzsche was going to be arguing against the validity or commonly held high valuation about "good" moral values such as "honesty, compassion, fairness" etc my defences went up and I wanted to immediately repudiate his 'immoralism'.  Recognizing this automatic reaction, I knew I had to keep an open mind about his premise and I was quite excited to read this text.

In his preamble, Nietzsche argues that if we just accept that these "good values" are universally of higher value, we risk accepting values that may hinder man's progress, that perhaps "the present were living at the expense of the future" and "that precisely morality would be to blame if a highest power and splendour of the human type - in itself possible - were never attained."

I found this concept very intriguing but when I started to read Nietzsche's words I was enormously irritated.  Diving into this book with no background in his previous work (which he says is necessary to understand this text) and with only a superficial knowledge of the evolution of Western thinking to the 19th century, I was really floundering trying to make sense of Nietzsche's arguments.  He keeps talking about the nobles at the beginning of this all, choosing the "good" moral values in order to self-glorify and to differentiate themselves from the "common herd".  But who were these nobles?  I don't see mankind as starting out with "nobles" nor do I see mankind as having held off from having values until some social stratification had occurred.  Nietzsche writes about (43.8-10)
the diseased softening and moralization by virtue of which the creature "man" finally learns to be ashamed of all his instincts 

I also have trouble with all Nietzsche's talk about Aryans, the blond beasts, about noble races, about Germanic peoples vs Teutons, Goths and Vandals.  I don't understand the context in which he would be discussing "blond beasts" and a "race of conquerors (58.13)  Where does this leave all the older civilizations: African, Asian, Middle Eastern - and their development of values?  I don't understand his discussion in his 1st section of "the Noble" and "the Jews" as being in opposition to the 'aristocratic value equation (16.31) and when he writes about Jesus as the "Redeemer bringing blessedness" and being "the seduction and detour to precisely those Jewish values and reshapings of the ideal" (17.31) I don't understand how this is going to the root of morals.  I'm pretty sure that many cultures pre-dating the years when Jesus lived among the Jews, Romans and the various tribes in the current Middle East, valued morals similar to ones ascribed to Christianity.

I can understand his suggestion that Christianity and/or Christian morals could have been a reaction, a push back against a ruling class, so that values such as humbleness, patience, obedience, forgiveness became elevated but I don't know that I would agree that honesty, fairness, generosity, compassion etc are not intrinsically 'high value' morals and ones which would have been universally considered estimable from mankind's earliest evolution.

Nietzsche considers that the basis for current morality, the estimation of "good values" was the slave revolt of the Jewish priestly class against the Roman noble class; and that the Reformation, Restoration, and even the French Revolution, were subsequent slave-revolts against the classical ideal, the noble class.

36.24-29
If[...] we place ourselves at the end of the enormous process, where the tree finally produces its fruit, where society and its morality of custom finally brings to light that to which  it was only the means: then we will find as the ripest fruit on its tree the sovereign individual, the individual resembling only himself, free again from the morality of custom, autonomous and supermoral (for "autonomous" and "moral" are mutually exclusive).

37.13-18
The proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this rare freedom, this power over oneself and fate, has sunk into his lowest depth and has become instinct, the dominant instinct - what will he call it, this dominant instinct, assuming that he feels the need to have a word for it? But there is no doubt: this sovereign human being calls it his conscience...

As I was reading Nietzsche's 2nd treatise: Guilt, Bad Conscience and Related Matters, where he writes about the basic, primitive instinct for revenge, for punishment, for making the person who has caused injury suffer, and how this instinct in a powerful, secure community or society can be sublimated or satisfied by 'the law', and where crime becomes a crime against the state rather than between individuals.   I wondered about aboriginal healing circles and restorative justice processes where the perpetrator and the victim come together with the community to sort out retribution with a focus on how to heal the community, compensate the victim for injury and help the perpetrator heal and reintegrate back into the community.

In this section, Nietzsche writes about the true will of life:
50.11-22
One must even admit to oneself something still more problematic: that, from the highest biological standpoint, conditions of justice can never be anything but exceptional conditions, as partial restrictions of the true will of life - which is out after power - and subordinating themselves as individual means to its overall end: that is, as means for creating greater units of power.  A legal system conceived of as sovereign and universal, not as a means in the battle of power complexes, but rather as means against all battle generally, say in accordance with Durhings's communist cliche that every will must accept every other will as equal, would be a principle hostile to life , a destroyer and dissolver of man, an attempt to kill the future of man, a sign of weariness, a secret pathway to nothingness - 
Niezsche speaks about how with punishment, the criminal is held back from feeling the wrongness of his deed by the fact that 'justice' employed similar actions (lying, bribery, spying, entrapment - and, in the case of countries like China, Iran, the USA...even capital punishment, state-sanctioned killing). 55.4-5
all of these thus actions his judges in no way reject and condemn in themselves
57.10-14
Generally what can be achieved among humans and animals through punishment is an increase of fear, a sharpening of prudence, mastery of the appetites: punishment thus tames man, but it does not make him "better" - one might with greater justification maintain the opposite. 

His section on pg 51 stating that the usefulness of something (whether physiological or institutional) has nothing to do with what caused its genesis or 'coming into being' was interesting to read, especially as we'll be reading Darwin's Origin of Species in a few weeks and also considering the debate over "form follows function" vs "function follows form."

Nietzsche writes about "the suffering of man from man, from himself - as the consequence of a forceful separation from his animal past." 57.23-24
I'm not sure I'm convinced by Nietzsche of mankind's innate desire to cause pain, to receive pleasure from suffering, from causing or observing suffering, whether to others or to him/herself.  His description 63.36-37 of mankind's "will to erect an ideal - that of the "holy God" - in order, in the face of the same, to be tangibly certain of his absolute unworthiness" was an interesting observation.  He counts that as an example of mankind's will to self-punish, to self-torture, towards guilt and "bad conscience."

It is frustrating in all these male writers to have to read their gender-biased ideas and opinions.  Nietzsche, in his 3rd treatise "The Aesthetic Ideal" writes about what these mean to different groups.  What are his examples of different groups which might each have a common viewpoint, distinct from other groups?

  • artists
  • philosophers
  • scholars
  • priests
  • saints
  • women
So women are all lumped together by their sex, not by their interests, education, employment.  And what might 'women' mean by aesthetic ideals? 67.4-5 "at best, one more charming trait of seduction, a little morbidezza on beautiful flesh, the angelicalness of a pretty, fat animal"
We've read so few women writers and their voices over the centuries have been so constricted, so unrecorded - it's very disheartening.

Nietzsche, in his treatise on the ascetic ideal, writes that (80.11-15):
Hubris is our entire stance toward nature today, our violation of nature with the help of machines and the so thoughtless inventiveness of technicians and engineers; hubris is our stance toward God, that is to say toward some alleged spider of purpose and morality behind the great snare-web of causality...
He calls modern-day mankind "nutcrackers of souls" for our propensity to dissect ourselves. Nietzsche states that in mankind's early days what are currently considered vices were virtues (cruelty, dissimulation, revenge, denial of reason, madness was considered divinity) and what are now considered virtues were considered vices back then (well-being, desire for knowledge, peace, compassion, being pitied and work were considered disgraceful, change was immoral). pg 81
He writes about contemplation - initially viewed with fear and distrust as unwarriorlike.  He discusses the example of the Brahmins saying the ascetics had to use self-castigation to win power.  The early philosophers came from these contemplative people, beginning as priest, soothsayer, magician and often assumed an aloof stance from life, even hostile to life, de-sensualized.  Nietzsche says the early philosophers had to hide within these roles, hide within self-segregation from everyday life to survive and function, to think.  83.19-28
The idea we are fighting about here is the valuation of our life on the part of the ascetic priest. [...] The ascetic treats life as a wrong path that one must finally retrace back to the point where it begins; or as an error one refutes through deeds - should refute: for he demands that one go along with him...
 This speaks to me - I've always had a problem with the idea that our life on earth (and I don't know whether this is all there is - my inclination is to this view) is just a stepping point to a better life, that our entire focus and goal should be towards attaining some other existence, to the point of completely devaluing our lives on earth.  Nietzsche says this devaluation is one of the longest & broadest 'facts' there is in mankind's history.

While I can't agree that mankind takes pleasure, perhaps our only pleasure, in causing pain, I do agree that I don't understand why we don't pursue pleasure exclusively nor why we have impulses of self-denial, of self-punishment or self-sabotage - or altruism for that matter.  I'd always assumed, in myself, that these were culturally-learned behaviours (possibly even somewhat but not exclusively gender based) or psychological pathologies.  The presence of the 'ascetic priest' in every age, every race, every culture, suggests that this is a necessary quality, a necessary human tendency, according to Nietzsche.  H extends this ascetic tendency to self-injury to a denial or a derision of reason, excluding reason from the "realm of truth and being" (85.1)
The ascetic ideal [...] is exactly the opposite of what its venerators suppose - in it and through it life is wrestling with death and against death [...] That this ideal has been able to rule and achieve power over humans to the extent that history teaches us it has, in particular wherever the civilization and taming of man has been successfully carried out, expresses a great fact: the diseasedness of the previous type of human, at least of the human made tame, the physiological struggle of man with death (more precisely: with satiety with life, with tiredness, with the wish for the "end")  (86.9-18)

Nietzsche considers that this negating one  represents a deeply sick, diseased mankind, that "the ascetic ideal springs from the protective and healing instincts of a degenerating life that seeks with every means to hold its ground and is fighting for its existence."  86.4-6 .
"The diseased are man's greatest danger: not the evil, not the 'beasts of prey [...]  The weakest are the ones who most undermine life among humans, who most dangerously poison and call into question our confidence in life, in man, in ourselves." 87.26-29
The Dostoyevsky text that we read this week, Notes from the Underground, gave us a frightening, depressing example of just such a human, a self-loathing man who lived almost entirely in his own head.

All this makes sense when you think about the negative qualities of religion, of convention: the hypocrites, the intolerant pious people, the people resentful of the happy, the light-hearted, the joyful - we've seen these rigid, sour, destructive characters over and over in literature.  Nietzsche is very scathing about the "moral onanist and 'self-gratifier'" 88.29  He then goes on to once again rail against womenkind:
The sick woman in particular: no one excels her in refinements for ruling, oppressing, tyrannizing. Furthermore the sick woman does not spare anything living, anything dead; she digs the most buried of things up again (the Bogos say: 'woman is a hyena')"  88.32-35
These miserable diseased people are also a danger because they wish to shove "their own misery, all misery generally into the conscience of the happy: so that the happy would one day be ashamed of their happiness"  (89.15-17)

Not sure about the mention of "moral boom-boom"  pg 89.8  (Eugen Duhring) - something I'll have to read about.

The sick aesthetic priest wages war, a war of the spirit, of cunning, against the beasts of prey.  Their biggest internal danger (of the sick herd) is resentment/revenge, what Nietzsche calls "ressentiment".  The priest does this by changing the direction of the ressentiment.  According to Nietzsche the resentment is turned towards the self and leads to concepts such as "sin", "corruption", "damnation", "guilt".  III 15-16

 Nietzsche focuses somewhat on Christianity (as the prevalent European religion) but feels other religions are just as false.  Many of them include a desire for a state beyond the senses, for anaesthetizing, hypnotizing oneself.  The Vedanta says "good and evil he shakes from himself, as a wise man; his realm no longer suffers through any deed; over good and evil, over both he passed beyond."  This state is sought after in both the brahministic and buddhistic religions.  This state of redemption is not attainable through virtue.  Nietzsche considers this desire to isolate oneself form feelings and desires is a form of hibernation, of deep sleep and a denial of life.  He feels the Eastern valuation for nirvana is the same as the esteem of the Epicurean, "the hypnotic feeling of nothingess"pg 97.



Tuesday, January 22, 2013

France: The Gods Will Have Blood

France, Anatole: The Gods Will Have Blood, Frederick Davies; Penguin Classics, London, 1979


I enjoyed this book - though the subject matter was grim.  It was strange to think of Mary Wollstonecraft being in Paris at the same time as the events depicted in this novel.  I thought the characters were interesting and the events in the novel were quite incredible even though they must bear a very close resemblance to what actually occurred and to many of the people involved.

Gamelin was a frightening character because he seemed quiet and sane yet was capable of so much evil action.  I thought that St. John Rivers in Jane Eyre (which is our next book) was similar in that he had a cold character and a somewhat self-righteousness nature.  I think as a missionary he would have been an intolerant man who would have exacted severe punishments on his "flock" 'for their own good'.
As with most readers, I really liked Maurice Brotteaux des Ilettes, the atheist epicurean.  He says
Ignorance is the necessary condition of human happiness...We are almost entirely ignorant of ourselves; absolutely of others.  In ignorance we find our bliss; in illusions, our happiness.

Barthes would have agreed with him about our ignorance of others.

Brotteaux also speaks on the value of human life, saying that he doesn't feel it has much value.
Nature...has certainly never given me evidence to believe that a man's life has any value; indeed on the contrary, she shows in many ways that it has none.  The sole destiny of all living beings seems only to become fodder of all other living beings fated also to the same end.
Like a good epicurean, atoms to atoms.

Gamelin asks Broatteaux whether he believes in Reason.
I hope at least, Citizen Brotteaux, that when the Republic establishes the worship of Reason, you will not withhold your acceptance of so wise a religion?
I love reason, but my love does not make me a fanatic, Brotteaux answered. 'Reason is our guide, a light to show us our way; but if you make a divinity of it, it will blind you and lead you into crime.'
This book very graphically and effectively describes what can happen when people become fanatical about change or about a cause.  I remember a movie I saw in the 90s about China and it showed the same situation where a major societal change has taken place and people are paranoid, fanatical and severe.  It was called The Blue Kite by Tian Zhuangzhuang.  You would see people turning neighbours in before they could turn you in.  I especially remember one scene where one of the main characters is at a meeting where they are dealing with a major problem and he leaves to go to the bathroom - when he comes back everyone turns silently to look at him and he immediately realizes that they have decided to make him the scapegoat and he is sent to a work camp.  I also remember a scene, I think from the same movie, where the officials have banned dogs (probably because of rabies concerns) and they are killing any dogs they see but they are also inspecting everyone's homes for dogs.  A family hides their little dog in a bench when the inspectors come and everything seems ok and then the dog whines and the inspectors stop as they are leaving and then follow the noise and find and seize the dog.  I can't remember whether they shoot it or just take it away but I can't imagine what the people would have felt like during those times.

The Gods Will have Blood reminded me of that atmosphere.  Movies I have seen about the Spanish Civil war and the revolution in Russia often dealt with those themes as well.
France writes:
The Convention intended to have one remedy for everything: Terror.  Blood would have blood.
France describes the magistrates, untrained men given the power of life and death.  Towards the end of the Terror, the prisons were so full of the accused that the magistrates were instructed not to even hear witnesses or defences, not to try and ascertain facts but just to use their consciences, their intuition to decide whether an accused was guilty or innocent.  France describes the trials of several
obstinate, empty-headed soldiers with the brains of sparrows in the skulls of oxen [...] What did it matter whether this soldier was innocent or guilty! [...] It was imperative to teach these generals of the Republic to conquer or to die.
Gamelin had a passion for the Republic but no love of humanity. He declaims:
I am a magistrate. I am responsible only to my conscience...Judgment is mine, not yours. I know neither friends nor enemies.
Brotteaux speaks to Gamelin about the regime and suggests a more Machiavellian process would have been more successful.
It seems to me they would have done better to have killed off quickly and secretly the more irreconcilable of their enemies and won over the others by gifts and promises.  A Tribunal such as yours kills off people too slowly and inspires too little fear to achieve any good. [...] The harm it does is to unite all in whom it inspires fear, and makes out of a diverse crowd of contradictory interests and passions, a powerful party capable of effective, united action.
Despite this somewhat ironical suggestion, Brotteaux seems to have a tolerance and acceptance or human foibles.  He mentions a curé he once knew and says:
We should adopt his principles and govern men as they are and not as we'd like them to be.
Gamelin has been swayed by the absolutism of the Revolution.  He describes hearing Robespierre speak and says:
Through the voice of this wise man, he was discovering lighter and purer truths; he was comprehending a philosophy, a metaphysic, of revolution which raised his thoughts far above gross material happenings into a world of absolute certainties safe from all the subjective errors of the senses. [...] Robespierre simplified everything for him, revealing the  good and the evil to him in simple, clear terms [...] Gamelin tasted the mystical joy of a believer who has come to know the word that saves and the word that destroys.
It's a frightening picture and France structured his tale very cleverly and marched me through to an ending where all the people who were in positions of power and adoration have now been brought low and sent to the guillotine but not before killing many of their former compatriots and friends.  A new order is being established and the novel ends with two of the survivors, Elodie and Desmahis joining together and moving on.


It was an unsettling novel and it made me want to go back and read A Tale of Two Cities.






Wednesday, January 16, 2013

Barthes: A Lover's Discourse

Barthes, Roland: A Lover's Discourse - Fragments, tr. Richard Howard; Hill and Wang, New York, 2010



A telling instance of the narrowness of a North American science-based education is that I'd never heard of Roland Barthes before receiving the reading list for LS801, the 2013 edition.  I found this a challenging book to get through.  It took me quite a few chapters to get into the format, the structure of the book.  Though Barthes is dissecting love into its various manifestations, I still found that I wanted to argue against many of his declarations and conclusions - or at least ask for more exposition.  I really wanted to be sitting around a long dinner table, discussing his ideas and hearing him expound on his views.  I needed more, to really understand what he was trying to say.  I also didn't really feel that I had a good sense of Barthes as a man, what he would have been like in conversation with friends.

I've never had to look up so many words/jargon as while reading this book.  Barthes is writing his discourse from a lengthy background of study, discussion and theorizing.  I found the book was too referential for someone who has not been a student of philosophy.  I very much liked the structure of the book because I am a person who likes collecting bits and pieces and later trying to make a whole of them.  It's probably best a book to be dipped into in small doses with much time to ponder in between, not read straight through like a narrative.  I felt I needed to read Barthes' source material (of which I have really only read Werther, and Plato's Symposium & Phaedrus so far) - and then go back and reread Barthes' discourse again.

Sentences such as the following gave me much grief in trying to understand what Barthes was trying to say:
On pg 103 THE GHOST SHIP,
"errantry does not align - it produces iridescence: what results is the nuance. Thus I move on, to the end of the tapestry, from one nuance to the next (the nuance is the last state of a colour which can be named; the nuance is the Intractable)."

or when speaking about amorous exuberance, on pg 86 about EXUBERANCE which
"can be interlaced with melancholy, with depressions and suicidal impulses, for the lover's discourse is not an average of states; but such a disequilibrium belongs to that black economy which marks me with its aberration and, so to speak, with its intolerable luxury."

Barthes provides several introductory pages about how the book is structured.  Regarding the meaning of the "Lover's Discourse" on pg 94 NOVEL/DRAMA, Barthes writes:
"Enamoration is a drama, if we restore to this word the archaic meaning Nietzsche gives it: 'Ancient drama envisioned great declamatory scenes, which excluded action [...] 'Amorous seduction (a pure hypnotic moment) takes place before discourse and behind the proscenium of consciousness: the amorous "event" is of a hieratic order: it is my own local legend, my little sacred history that I declaim to myself, and this declamation of a fait accompli (frozen, embalmed, removed from any praxis) is the lover's discourse." 
Barthes goes to numerous sources, from the written realm but also from conversations with friends and acquaintances - and his marginalia is interesting.

Some random bits that I enjoyed or puzzled over:
Under JEALOUSY pg 145 he quotes Djeddi in La poesie amoureuse des Arabes Joseph yielded 'to the extent of a mosquito's wing.'  He writes that his references are "not authoritative but amical".
After Baudelaire and Ruysbroek "the gentleness of the abyss"
He writes that a sigh is "an expression of the emotion of absence."



In WHAT IS TO BE DONE, pg 62, Barthes speaks of
"Ethics, the unpersuadable science of behaviour."

And on pg 71 THE OTHER'S BODY
Language is a skin: I rub my language against the other. It is as if I had words instead of fingers, or fingers at the tips of my words.  My language trembles with desire.


On pg 129  in IDENTIFICATIONS:
Identification [with other lost lovers] is not a psychological process; it is a pure structural operation: I am the one who has the same place I have.

In the section ATOPOS pg 34, defined as "unclassifiable, of a ceaselessly unforeseen originality,"
Barthes describes the beloved in one of the most succinct and beautiful ways I have ever come across:
"the other is, precisely, Unique, the singular Image which has miraculously come to correspond to the specialty of my desire."  
 He goes on to say that:
"The other is the figure of my truth, and cannot be imprisoned in any stereotype (which is the truth of others).
This agrees with my perception that there is not "One" person, there are many possible people that may be potential lovers but it all depends on timing, circumstance, the many external as well as internal factors.
A potential lover's desirability is also affected by mass culture.  In SHOW ME WHOM TO DESIRE
on pg 136, Barthes describes love as an "affective contagion,"
this induction, proceeds from others, from the language, from books, from friends: no love is original.  (Mass culture is a machine for showing desire: here is what must interest you, it says, as if it guessed that men are incapable of finding what to desire by themselves.
If this was true in the 70s, I can only begin to imagine how much more this applies to the 21st century.

This is unlike the Ancient Greeks' conception of love, the androgyne.  Barthes refers several times to the idea of the androgyne as propounded by Plato/Socrates and Aristophanes.  This is an image and a concept that has stuck with me ever since we read The Symposium.  It's appealing to think that there is another out there who fills the missing bits in oneself - there's a inevitability and durability to that concept that can be reassuring when in the torment of the love gone wrong or faded away.  In I WANT TO UNDERSTAND pg 60, he reprises Zeus' command to Apollo to 
"turn the faces of the divided Androgynes...toward the place where they had been cut apart...'so that the sight of their division might render them less insolent'."
 - like Adam & Eve and the citizens with the Tower of Babel in Genesis, we mortals sometimes presume.

In UNION pg 226
"En sa moytie, ma moytie je recolle - to her half, I rejoin my own half...desire is to lack what one has - and to give what one does not have: a matter of supplements, not complements."
Barthe spends an afternoon trying to draw Aristophanes' conception of the original hermaphrodites (androgyne figure) and concludes it is a "farce figure" and "out of the mad couple is born the obscenity of the household (one cooks, for life, for the other)."

He was very perceptive in describing all the odd little facets of love relationships.  On pg 92  THE WORLD THUNDERSTRUCK he is speaking of writing about one's own love (in journals, correspondence etc) and notes
"the events of an amorous life are so trivial that they gain access to writing only by an immense effort: one grows discouraged writing what, by being written, exposes its own platitude.

He was also effective describing love relationship other than the romantic or sexual ones.  In NO ANSWER pg 167 
"The perfect [...] friend, is he not the one who constructs around you the greatest possible resonance? Cannot friendship be defined as a space with total sonority?"

I had a hard time with much of Barthes mention of his mother and mothers and sons.  He portrays his mother is such a 2-dimensional, childish way.  She is discussed only in relation to her effect on her child, not as a person, a lover in her own right.  I'm not sure if this is a mother-son thing or a gender thing (Barthes is less interested in women as individuals, especially insofar as love is concerned).  In discussing Werther, Barthes refers to the famous blue coat which he was wearing when he met Lotte.  On pg 128  in BLUE COAT AND YELLOW VEST, Barthes writes:
"This blue garment imprisons him so effectively that the world around him vanishes: nothing but the two of us: by this garment Werther forms for himself a child's body in which phallus and mother are united, with nothing left over.  This perverse outfit was worn across Europe by the novel's enthusiasts, and it was known as a "costume a la Werther."

This isn't an analysis that resonates with me.  Nor can I identify or agree with his statement on pg 133 in IMAGES
"I project myself there [into a romantic painting of a cold scene] as a tiny figure, seated on a block of ice, abandoned forever.  "I'm cold." the lover says, "let's go back"; but there is no road, no way, the boat is wrecked.  There is a coldness particular to the lover, the chilliness of the child (or of any young animal) that needs maternal warmth.
To me, a woman, Barthes seems to be condescending when he mentions women.  He doesn't mention women often but when he does, it often has a negative cast.  In DOMNEI pg 82
"I shall exasperate myself with the chatter of women in the drugstore who are delaying my return to the instrument to which I am subjugated"and in THE DEDICATION pg 76
"I have this fear: that the given object may not function properly because of some insidious defect...for example, the latch [of a box] doesn't work (the shop being run by society women)"
In GRADIVA pg 126
"I want to possess fiercely, but I also know how to give actively.  Then who can manage this dialectic successfully? Who, if not the woman, the one who does not make for any object but only for . . . giving? So if a lover manages to 'love', it is precisely insofar as he feminizes himself, joins the class of Grandes Amoureuses, of Woman Who Love Enough to Be Kind."

The section which really resonated with me was THE UNKNOWABLE, on pg 134:
"I can't get to know you" means "I shall never know what you really think of me." I cannot decipher you because I do not know how you decipher me.

"To expend oneself, to bestir oneself for an impenetrable object is pure religion."
"To make the other into an insoluble riddle on which my life depends is to consecrate the other as a god."
This made me think of Elizabeth Smart who seems to have consecrated her life to orbiting around Barker.  Someone in our discussion noted that one of her sons said that all her life she regarded George Barker as a Jesus-figure.

Barthes goes on to write, in this section, that
"all the action of love obtains from me is merely this wisdom: that the other is not to be known." "I am then seized with that exaltation of loving someone unknown, someone who will remain so forever: a mystic impulse: I know what I do not know."

In THIS CAN'T GO ON, pg 141, Barthes describes suffering in love as pleasurable.
"Ever the 'artist', I make form itself into content" (echoes of McLuhan's 'the medium is the message').  It's not about what is causing the suffering, it's about the suffering itself.
Once the exaltation of suffering has dissipated, Barthes says he is "reduced to the simplest philosophy: that of endurance."  He quotes a folk poem that accompanies Japanese Daruma dolls:
Such is life Falling over seven times And getting up eight.
In JEALOUSY, pg 144
"As a jealous man, I suffer four times over: because I am jealous, because I blame myself for being so, because I fear my jealousy will wound the other, because I allow myself to be subject to a banality: I suffer from being excluded, from being aggressive, from being crazy, and from being common."
Barthes includes the etymology of the word jaloux which interestingly is borrowed from the troubadours.


He very accurately describes many of the progressions and devastating aspects of love, the events that wear away at the foundations.  In NO ANSWER pg 167 he writes:
"When you were talking to him, discussing any subject at all, X frequently seemed to be looking away, listening to something else: you broke off, discouraged; after a long silence, X would say: 'Go on, I'm listening to you'; then you resumed as best you could the thread of a story in which you no longer believed."

Also in GRADIVA, pg 125 he describes much of the game-playing which drives me crazy within a relationship and which is supremely irritating to have to observe in other people's relationships.  If only we could keep the resolve and clear-sightedness we can have when outside of our relationships, for when we are in the throes of relationships' dark sides.

I found less agreement with his statement in THE HEART pg 53, that "only the lover and the child have a heavy heart" but as with many of the areas where I initially found I disagreed with Barthes or even felt really irritated by something he wrote, when I thought about it more and tried to dissect or even refute it, eventually I could distill my ideas and examples down into his truth.  The examples I could think of of non-love related angst and pain often could be reduced to a sense of isolation, of aloneness, of abandonment.  Perhaps this is where he gets his repeated return to comparisons with mother-son bonds.

In one section, GOSSIP, he unexpectedly (for me) compares passion and reason, and writes on pg 184,
the gossip is light, cold, it thereby assumes the status of a kind of objectivity; its voice...seems to double the voice of knowledge (scientia)...When knowledge, when science speaks, I sometimes come to the point of hearing its discourse as the sound of a gossip which describes and disparages lightly, coldly, and objectively what I love: which speaks of what I love according to the truth.
In an echo of Neil Young "It's better to burn out than to fade away"in THE INTRACTABLE on pg 23 Barthes affirms love as a value regardless of how it all works out in the end; that he can be happy and wretched at the same time.  When told "this kind of love is not viable" he asks: 
"Why is the viable a "Good Thing?  Why is it better to last than to burn?"and states that he has "withdrawn from all finality."



SOBRIA EBRIETAS
Barthes ends his discourse with this section and defines this as abandoning the "will-to-possess".  He quotes a zen saying:
"As I sit calmly, without doing anything, spring comes and the grass grows of its own accord."
On pg 8 in HOW THIS BOOK IS CONSTRUCTED Barthes specifies that he is not trying to set down a philosophy of love but merely to affirm it.  Such a philosophy would be a perversion of its elements, a monster, and he quotes from a mathematician that "we must not underestimate the power of chance to engender monsters," warning the reader not to draw conclusions from the order of the various sections.  It's not a book to be read as a narrative and it's a book I will come back to, to read a section here and there and think about it, then come back to it again after I've done further reading and studying.  I'll put it on the bookshelf near my bed with some of the other bits I want to re-read.



Saturday, January 12, 2013

Discussion: Werther and Antigone

We had our 1st discussion since we broke at the end of the Fall term.  It was great to see everyone again and plunge back in to our progression through the philosophy and literature of the last 4000 years.  Stephen reviewed the texts we'll be covering this term.  They are grouped into themes, and not arranged as chronologically as LS800.  The 1st set deal with overwhelming passion: The Sorrows of Young Werther, and Jean Anouilh's version of Antigone, written in Paris during WWII.  Next week Elizabeth Smart's By Grand Central Station I Sat Down and Wept and A Lover's Discourse by Roland Barthes. Then Anatole France's The Gods Will Have Blood (about fanaticism during the French Revolution) and after that Jane Eyre (reason making an appearance).  We then move into the next series, mainly concerned with reason/unreason: Doestoevesky, Nietzsche, Ibsen, Kierkegaard; then 3 big texts: Darwin's Origin of the Species, Marx's Communist Manifesto and Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents as well as our 3rd version of Antigone, also written during WWII but by Bertold Brecht.  We end the Politics and the Body series with Lady Chatterly's Lover and Mary Shelley's Frankenstein.
The final series are 5 more modern texts that examine much of what we have been reading and discuss where that leaves us: Adam Phillips 'Darwin's Worms', Woolf's 'A Room of One's Own', Antonio Damasio's 'Descartes Error' and Elaine Scarry's 'On Beauty'; finishing April 13 with Jacques Derrida's 'The Animal that Therefore I Am'.

We started with Goethe's Werther, which he wrote as a young man after suffering through unrequited love.  He used the writing of Werther as catharsis for his feelings.  It is considered one of the 1st novels of the Romantic period, where the focus moved to the individual, with the appearance of modern self-consciousness and sensibility (the importance of personal feelings).  Werther was an alienated artist and didn't really have a firm place in any of the worlds he entered: too wealthy and intellectual for the rural Waldheim but too low-born for the aristocracy and court life (though had he been happy to be a clerk toiling away in the background, he would have been fine at court).

Stephen sent out some material about Werther which included a quote by Goethe about Werther.  I always wondered about one term he uses, "true penetration of mind," which I have read in various 19th century books.
“I portray a young person who, endowed with profound, pure feeling and true penetration of mind, loses himself in rhapsodic dreams, undermines himself by speculation until he finally, ravaged by the additional effect of unhappy passions and in particular by an infinite love, shoots himself in the head.”
What does the speaker mean when they use this phrase?  Is it sympathy of mind with the speaker or something more objective?

Lorraine led the discussion.  She brought 2 quotes, applicable to passion, from a book she was reading over the break called Adult Literacy.

[Fear] has no logic.  It destroys confidence and common sense: my actions and my works were sometimes inappropriate to the situation at hand. (Helfield, 1997)  Lorraine proposed that this sentence would apply equally to passion.

Our humanity is most evident in our feelings, yet it is this affective aspect of our nature that is so often ignored. (Goleman, 1995)

Lorraine notes Goethe/Werther's use of "I", very brave to use 1st person.  She felt Werther was arrogant.  He was certainly self-absorbed and I think he was condescending in some regards (to some of the people he met: the rural people, the aristocrats at court and the ambassador he worked for).  He was probably arrogant about his own abilities but what mainly came through for me was his absorption in his own feelings.  For me he would have been a tiresome penpal.

Lorraine mentioned a similar book about unrequited love: Yentl by Isaac Bashevis Singer

The epistolatory style used in Werther was very popular for awhile in the 18th and 19th centuries but is not used as much any more.  I have a fondness for it -  that feeling that you are peeking into someone else's life as it unfolds.  I still remember reading and rereading "Daddy-Long-Legs".  I'm not sure it would count as great literature but I did enjoy it when I was young. The limitation of a book advanced only via letters (usually just one person's letters as is the case in Werther) is you only see things from the letter writer's viewpoint.  We don't know much of Lotte or Albert, or even Wilhelm's viewpoint.

Werther is not only about love and passion and pain but also commentary about the society of the time that locked people into very limited roles and options.  Lotte had no choice but to marry the man her parents had betrothed her to, Albert was busy working his way up the minor functionary pathway.  Werther himself was not part of the labouring classes nor completely accepted by the aristocracy but his options to move in and out of these strata was curtailed.  The farmhand was in love with his mistress, who needed labourers to manage the farm she was left yet they were not allowed to have a legitimate relationship though this would likely have been an ideal outcome for both of them.

The novel is set at a time when we are seeing the beginning of the change towards valuing the individual and also the inroads against the predominance and unassailability of the aristocracy.  Europe's resistance to this change is what soon will result in the French Revolution.

ANTIGONE
Does the metatheatre aspect, with the Prologue/Chorus announcing right from the beginning what was going to happen in the play, add or take away from the impact or enjoyment of the play.  Most people felt that it helped, made them concentrate more on the characters and what they said rather than wondering what was going to happen.  It also put entire audience on the same footing knowing what was going to happen.
Lauren mentioned that a friend of hers had just come back from London and saw quite a few plays and in every single one actors would come out for 30-60 minutes before the play started and put on their makeup on the stage, chatting with the audience.  The new trend it seems.

How did the anachronistic elements work?   For most people it either supported the play or at least didn't detract from it.  The stylistic choice to start with breaking the 4th wall already tears us away from the Greek version of the play and from our expectations.  Having 20th century garb, motor vehicles and manners of speaking was not jarring (to read - I'm not sure how it would be seeing the play itself).  I do remember really disliking and being bothered by reading the "hillbilly accents" given to the Spartans in the version of Lysistrata I read.

In Sophocles' version of Antigone, Creon experiences enormous personal growth (through tragedy) during the play. Does Anouilh's Creon experience any growth or change?  I didn't think he did.  In Anouilh's version, Creon was an urbane city dweller when he was suddenly faced with having to give up his desired life and assume the duties of King of Thebes.  In the play he notes that he did this out of a strong sense of duty.  This Creon is much more nuanced and kinder than Sophocles ruler but he experienced his growth before the start of the play.  He does suffer change (the death of son and wife an his role in Antigone's death) but we don't know how this may have altered him.

In Sophocles' Antigone, her reasons for defying Creon and burying her brother would have been supported by the audience as she was obeying the death rituals required of family in order to honour them and to honour the gods.  In Anouilh's version, Antigone just seems to be stubbornly set on dying because she can't face the inevitable compromises of maturity and age.  She is certainly a figure that is true to her feelings, her passions but her passions are passions for her feelings not passions for anyone else so she is a very self-absorbed character and not as sympathetic because of this.

Lauren asked whether Anouilh was misogynistic in his treatment of his female characters?  None if the 4 female characters were particularly well-rounded or compelling.  Some liked Ismene (Abilio preferred Sophocles' Ismene), some felt the nurse provided a warm glimpse into what the 2 girls childhoods and homelifes would have been.  I'm not sure I would have called him misogynistic.  Creon was the most interesting character but aside from him and the young idealistic passionate Antigone, all the other characters, male or female, were quite superficially sketched.

I found both these books interesting.  Both from the perspective of temperament and of age, I can't identify with either Werther or Antigone but I do feel that being able to respond with emotion, being able and willing to react emotionally to the world around you, are what add the joy to life.  I just can't give myself up to this and ignore all other considerations.  Neither Werther nor Antigone would have approved of me.











Friday, October 26, 2012

Barolome de Las Casas's A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies

De Las Casas, Bartolome; A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies; Transl. Nigel Griffin; Penguin Classics, London, 2004

This is the text that I have to present to the class for discussion.  I was interested in this text partly because I'm very interested in Latin America and its history.  I also remember reading a biography of Mary I of England which also dealt with Prince Phillip (Felipe II) of Spain.  That period of time (in Spain and in England) has always stuck in my mind and De Las Casas' book was published, and the events he relates occurred, during that period.

Bartolome de las Casas was born in the late 15th c. and sailed as a young man in Columbus' 4th voyage to the Americas, to Hispaniola in 1502.  It was amazing to read a text written by someone who was present 10 years after Columbus first reached the Americas.  De Las Casas initially was there for commercial reasons, to make his fortune, accumulating land and slaves as a colonist.  In 1511 he heard a Dominican priest preach a sermon on the text "a voice crying in the wilderness", denouncing the Spanish treatment of the aboriginal peoples in the Americas.  De Las Casas was also present during Velasquez' brutal invasion of Cuba in 1513 - and he was horrified by what he saw.  His attitudes began to change and he started to protest the brutality used by the Spaniards as they invaded and took over the governance of the Americas, subjugating and tyrannizing the local inhabitants.  Initially De Las Casas objected to the brutality, greed and dishonesty but still thought that governing the local peoples was just if it were done more cooperatively and less brutally.  De Las Casas became ordained and travelled back and forth from Spain to the Americas speaking about what was going on in the Americas and preaching reform.  He received approval from Charles V (Holy Roman Emperor) to set up farming communities in what is now Venezuela where Spanish settlers would try to live in peace with the local people.  His vision was betrayed by the greed and non-cooperation of the settlers.  Their continued slave trade angered the indigenous peoples leading to violence and counter-violence and De Las Casas' project failed.



He was devastated by this failure and retreated to a Dominican monastery for many years.  He began to write and to read many philosophers.  It was this time period that led him to change his thinking about the rights of the indigenous peoples.  When he left the monastery in 1530, he became a very outspoken and dedicated proponent, not only of an end to the brutality and venality practiced by the Spaniards but of the rights of the indigenous people to their land and property.  He did not go so far as to think that Spain had no right to be there (Pope Constantine had granted sovereignty to Spain over all the "newly discovered" lands across the Atlantic Ocean, via the 'Donation of Constantine') but De Las Casas did feel that Spanish sovereignty provided citizenship rights to the indigenous people as well as their pre-existing rights to their property.  He also felt that natural laws, laws of humanity, required just treatment of the native people.

De Las Casas - important dates:


1484
Born in Seville to Pedro de Las Casas, a merchant who travelled to the Indies with Columbus
1502
Leaves Spain for Hispaniola
1511
Listens to a sermon by Dominican priest, Father Antonio de Montesinos, denouncing Spain's treatment of the AmerIndians.
1513
Present during the violent, bloody conquest of Cuba led by Diego Velazquez.
1515
Returns to Spain to plead the AmerIndian cause before King Ferdinand.
1516
Returns to America as a member of a commission sent to investigate the treatment of the Indians.
1519
Returns to Spain once more.
1520
Presents a defense of the AmerIndian to King Charles I (Emperor Charles V) The king supports his plan to build a colony in present-day Venezuela inhabited by both Spanish and free Indians.
1522
In January, after more than a year of continuous opposition of local encomenderos who incite AmerIndian attacks on the farmers, the experiment fails.
1523
Disappointed, Las Casas joins the Dominicans in Santo Domingo and focuses his energy on writing, begins both Apologetica historia de las Indias and Historia de Las Indies.
1530
Returned to Spain and obtained a royal decree prohibiting the enforcement of slavery in Peru which he delivered personally.
1537
Receives some support from the Pope in the form of Paul III's bull Sublimis Deus which declared the American AmerIndians as rational beings with souls and that their lives and property should be protected.
1542
Returns to Spain where he convinced Charles I to signs the "New Laws" which prohibited AmerIndian slavery and attempted to put an end to the encomienda system by limiting ownership of serfs to a single generation. Writes "A brief report on the Destruction of the Indians," which horrifies the court.
1544
To ensure enforcement of the laws he is named bishop of Chiapas in Guatemala - meets immediate opposition. He declares that any Spaniard who refuse to release his AmerIndians is to be denied absolution. A year later the inheritance limitation is rescinded by Charles V.
1547
Returns to Spain and gives up his episcopal dignity. Becomes an influential figure at court and at the Council of the Indies.
1550
Meets Sepulveda in the famous debate at the Council of Valladolid.
1552
Publishes The Destruction of the Indies. Spends the next fourteen years writing and appearing at court and councils in defense of the Indians.
1566
Dies in Madrid and buried in the convent chapel of Our Lady of Atocha.
1875
Historia de las Indias first published.

De Las Casas spent most of his adult life travelling through the Americas and back and forth to Spain, arguing for, preaching and educating about reform of Spanish rule in the Americas.  He initially advocated only for gentler treatment (the doctrine of peaceful conversion), he then progressed to supporting the legal rights of the indigenous peoples and was instrumental in several laws being passed by the Spanish monarchy to protect the indigenous people though these rights were not upheld by the Spanish conquistadors, settlers and some greedy clergy in the Americas.  Eventually De Las Casas became more radicalized and began to use his clerical office to try and compel change, by threatening excommunication or withholding absolution to those not adhering to the revised laws.

By the end of his lifetime he had seen 3 monarchies govern over the Americas (Ferdinand & Isabella, Charles I/V and Felipe II) with little improvement in the conditions for the local people.  He had argued his cause in many forums, had circulated his writings which not only shocked those in Spain but reached a wider audience in Europe.  Though he didn't see much improvement in his lifetime, conditions slowly began to change as the power of the initial conquistadors was curtailed and the encomiendero system was abolished.  

De Las Casas' text is difficult to read only because of its subject matter.  He goes through each country, roughly in the order in which they were "conquered" and the littany of brutal oppression, treachery, greed is very hard to read about.  He reports about one native leader who was about to be executed.  Asked to convert to Christianity/Catholicism so that he would have a chance at Heaven after he died, the local leader asked if the Spaniards around him were examples of Christians and would they be going to Heaven.  When he was told 'yes' he said that in this case he did not wish any chance of going to Heaven.
It's difficult to consider that human beings can do this to any living creature much less to other human beings.  I can't help but think of what it would have been like for the local people to have the Spaniards arrive and to then suffer such change, brutality and oppression.
When you try to explain it by saying those were brutal times you then run up against De Las Casas and the other clerics who spoke out against the brutality and were able to see and recognize the injustice.  Was it a matter of education?  Was it a matter of the type of person who would have been on those voyages of exploration (education, class, situation, greed, fitness for society?).

What was happening in Europe at the time?
15th century Spain:
  • Uniting of five kingdoms in the Iberian Peninsula: Castile, Aragón (which included Catalonia, Valencia, the kingdom of Naples, Sardinia and Sicily), Granada, Navarre and Portugal. By early in the 16th century they had been reduced to two: Castile/Aragón and Portugal.
  • Castile and Aragón were united in the late 15th century through the marriage of Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragón (tiny Navarre was swallowed by Aragón in 1513). 
  •  The marriage between Isabel and Ferdinand in 1469  (she was 18 and he was 17) 
  •  By January 1492, Granada was in Spanish hands.  Granada was the last Muslim kingdom of the once powerful al-Andalus and Isabella and Ferdinand saw its conquest as a necessary step for consolidating their political power and for religious uniformity in the peninsula. 
  • The terms of surrender were generous and included freedom of religion. Religious conformity, however, was still the overall objective of the Christians. Already on March 31, 1492, Ferdinand and Isabel signed an edict giving Jews four months to accept baptism or go into exile; by 1501 the Muslims faced the same choice.
  •  Christianity was now the common bond that held Spaniards together.  There was widespread suspicion that their conversion was not genuine.  This was not a new phenomenon; the 15th century had seen an explosion of Jews accepting baptism.  Many were sincere in their new faith, many others continued to practice their Judaic faith in secret. It was to investigate the suspicion of heresy amongst Conversos that the infamous Inquisition was introduced into Castile in 1478.
  • Under the Mongol Empire's hegemony over Asia, Europeans had long enjoyed a safe land passage, the 'Silk Road', to China and India. After the Fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Empire (Turks) in 1453, the land route to Asia difficult and dangerous. A sea route to the Indies was needed.
  • Portugal had made advances in navigation, allowing for more ambitious voyages & explorations.
  •  Late 15th c., the Catholic monarchs had just completed an expensive campaign in the Iberian Peninsula (la Reconquista), reconquering Granada, and were desperate for money. Columbus’ proposed search for a new route to the Indies promised access to these riches.  He 1st sailed to Americas in August 1492
16th Century  -  Golden Age for Spain
At the beginning of the 16th century, there was a general feeling of pride and self confidence in Spain. 
Further impetus to the general air of confidence was given by two far-reaching events:
  • the “discovery” of America (Las Indias) by Christopher Columbus in 1492
  • the accession in 1516 to the Spanish throne of the powerful Hapsburg family of central Europe.
With the discovery of Las Indias and the acquisition of vast new lands, Spain embarked on transatlantic imperial conquests.  With the accession of the Hapsburg Carlos I to the Spanish throne, Spain suddenly acquired large areas of central and northern Europe.

From the marriage of Isabella and Ferdinand in 1469 there grew within about 55 years an imperial power whose possessions included large areas in Europe and America, and whose reach even stretched across the Pacific (the first voyage around the world was completed in 1522, led by the Portuguese explorer Magellan but under Spanish auspices).

The arranged marriage of Ferdinand and Isabel`s youngest daughter, Juana, to the son of the Hapsburg emperor, Maximilian I lead to the establishment of the Hapsburg dynasty in Spain by their son, Charles.
Charles I/V (1500-1558; ruled Spain 1516-56, Holy Roman Emperor 1519-58)

Charles I/V had large imperial ambitions, costly ambitions.  He requested money in pursuit of the office of Holy Roman Emperor (HRE) and did become HRE (as Charles V) in 1519.  His priorities extended beyond Spain, with high costs to the Spanish treasury. Of the 40 years that Charles ruled, he spent only 16 in Spain; in the last 13 years of his reign he didn’t set foot in Spain. His son, and successor, Felipe II, in contrast, was devoted to and spent most of his time in Spain.



Charles won Spaniards over by identifying them increasingly with the mission of defending Catholicism. His struggle with the threat of heretical Protestants in Northern Europe and with Ottoman (Turkish) activities in the Mediterranean recalled the crusading spirit of the Reconquista, which was still relatively fresh in the collective Spanish memory. 

The costs of defending imperial (HRE) and Catholic interests were enormous. The only recourse was to borrow money against the future gold and silver coming from the Americas. However, Spain had lost a large part of its own banking resources with the expulsion of the Jews in 1492, so the borrowed money came mainly from established bankers in Germany (Fuggers) and Genoa (Italy).  At one point parts of South America were granted by Spain to German banking interests.  I’ve always wondered a bit at the amount of German interests in South America as I didn’t think of Germany as having colonizing interests so far away.  It makes sense now.

SPAIN in the AMERICAS
Two rationalizations put forth for the Spanish Invasion of the Americas and their actions towards the indigenous peoples:
  • 1.     There was the moral framework of the ‘just war’.
  • 2.     Justification under Aristotelian concept of “natural slaves”

Thomas Aquinas had asked whether war was "always" sinful.  There was a general presumption against the shedding of blood.  The pacifists understood this prohibition to be absolute, while the ‘just war’ theorists maintained the prohibition could be overridden provided certain conditions were fulfilled.

The Thomistic tradition of just war identified three conditions for a war to be just:
  1. ·      that it be commanded by a sovereign authority,
  2. ·       that a just cause be present owing to some "fault" in the enemy, and
  3. ·       that there exist a right intention to advance good or avoid evil.

  • The supporters of Spanish conquest believed that rightful authority resided in the papal pronouncement of Alexander VI in 1493 that Spain had just title to the Indies for the purposes of conversion to Christianity. 
  • The "fault" of the AmerIndians was usually noted to be refusal to accept the Christian faith.
  • I haven’t seen as much discussion about the 'right intention' but it likely went along the lines of bringing Spanish knowledge, religion, advances (iron) to the AmerIndians.

The 2nd rationalization for the Spanish invasion of the Americas derived from classical philosophy rather than religious tradition: the Aristotelian notion that some persons are slaves by nature, born to serve masters. This was the argument used by de Sepulveda in 1550 at Valladolid. Fourteen distinguished judges were summoned by the emperor to assess whether war could be justly waged against the AmerIndians.  De Sepulveda cited the natural slavery argument and De Las Casas made the arguments contained in this text (A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies) and in his massive “History of the Indies” and “Apologetic History of the Indies”.
Part of the just war rationalization relied on the dehumanization of the indigenous peoples and biblical arguments based on Battle of Jericho (Encisco in 1513).
In 1513, Martin Fernandez de Encisco argued before the crown's counselors that "the king might very justly send men to require these idolatrous AmerIndians to hand over their land to him, for it was given him by the pope. If the AmerIndians would not do this, he might justly wage war against them, kill them and enslave those captured in war, precisely as Joshua treated the inhabitants of Jericho."  The biblical record of the legendary battle of Jericho observes that the Israelites "utterly destroyed all that was in the city, both man and woman, young and old, and ox, and sheep, and ass with the edge of the sword." (Joshua 6; 1 Sam. 15).

Encisco's biblical paradigm of conquest provided the theological grounds for the infamous Requirement (Requerimiento), issued under the authorization of King Ferdinand, in 1514.  This was a text carried by all conquistadors, to be read out to the indigenous people, warning them that if they did not convert and did not submit to Spain, they would be [rightfully] slaughtered.
De Las Casas discussed this requirement in this text, reporting that the Conquistador’s would obey the letter rather than the spirit of the law, reading the proclamation out loud, at night and at a distance from the sleeping villages where no one could hear the words (not that they would have understood them given that they were read out in Spanish and the meaning would not be obvious without extensive explanation and education).

De Las Casas' ideologies evolved to center on the right of the AmerIndians to their land, on the principle of self-determination, on the subordination of all Spanish interests, including those of the Crown, to AmerIndian interests, material and spiritual. Towards the end of his life, Las Casas ultimately advanced a program calling for
  •  the suppression of the encomienda,
  • liberation of the AmerIndians from all forms of servitude except a small voluntary tribute to the Crown, and
  • the restoration of the ancient AmerIndian states and rulers, the rightful owners of those lands. Over these states the Spanish monarch would preside as "Emperor over many Kings" in order to fulfill his sacred mission of bringing the AmerIndians to the Catholic Faith and the Christian way of life. This was the only Spanish title to the Indies that Las Casas regarded as legitimate. The King's agents in the performance of this mission would be a small number of model religious who would cooperate with the native rulers, with the AmerIndians separated from the corrupting and oppressive presence of lay Spaniards.

He promoted practical political measures like the New Laws of 1542, and began to systematically use the powers of the Church: excommunication, interdict, and denial of absolution to secure compliance with these protective legislations.  Though he was successful in seeing several laws either revised or brought into being that were intended to offer some protection or justice to the inhabitants of the Americas, in practice De Las Casas' efforts were usually subverted by local Spanish resistance or by later being rescinded or weakened by the monarchs.

His writings in other texts show how his views and thinking were drastically advanced from the self-interest at play in Spain's "conquered lands" as well as the greed and appetite for power and for catholic dominance at play back in Spain.  As early as 1519, in a rebuttal to Juan de Quevedo, Bishop of Tierra Firme, who questioned the morals and capacities of the indigenous peoples, De Las Casas stated:
Our Christian religion adapts equally to all the nations of the world and receives all nations, and strips none of its liberty or dominion, nor does it reduce any people to servitude on the pretext that they are slaves "by nature."
For all the peoples of the world are men, and the definition of all men, collectively and severally, is one: that they are rational beings. All possess understanding and volition, being formed in the image and likeness of God; all have the five exterior senses and the four interior senses, and are moved by the objects of these; all have natural capacity or faculties to understand and master the knowledge that they do not have; and this is true not only of those that are inclined toward good but those that by reason of their depraved customs are bad; all take pleasure in goodness and in happy and pleasant things and all abhor evil and reject what offends or grieves them.... 

Thus all mankind is one, and all men are alike in what concerns their creation and all natural things, and no one is born enlightened. From this it follows that all of us must be guided and aided at first by those who were born before us.


In his last will and testament Las Casas wrote:
To act here at home on behalf of all those people 
out in what we call the Indies, 
the true possessors of those kingdoms, those territories.
  To act against the unimaginable, unspeakable violence
 and evil and harm they have suffered from our people,
 contrary to all reason, all justice,
so as to restore them to the original liberty
 they were lawlessly deprived of,
 and get them free of death by violence, death they still suffer.
He also commented on the probability of divine retribution, a factor that had always been uppermost in his mind throughout his time in the Americas:
I think that God shall have to pour out his fury and anger
 on Spain for these damnable, rotten, infamous deeds 
done so unjustly, so tyrannically, so barbarously 
to those people, against those people.
  For the whole of Spain has shared in the blood-soaked riches,
 some a little, some a lot, but all shared in goods 
that were ill-gotten, wickedly taken with violence and genocide-
and all must pay unless Spain does a mighty penance.
I'm looking forward to the discussion.